STS-74 Space Shuttle Mission Report by Fricke, Robert W., Jr.
STS-74
SPACE SHUTTLE
MISSION REPORT
NSTS-37404
February 1996
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, Texas
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19970001479 2020-06-16T03:47:18+00:00Z
NOTE
The STS-74 Space Shuttle Mission Report was prepared from
inputs received from the Orbiter Project Office as well as other
organizations. The following personnel may be contacted
should questions arise concerning the technical content of
this document.
Kenneth L. Brown
713-483-3891
Orbiter and subsystems
George Harsh, MSFC
205-544-4827
MSFC Elements (SRB,
RSRM, SSME, ET,
SRSS, and MPS)
Dianne J. Murphy, JSC
713-483-1055
Payloads/Experiments
J. Williams, JSC
713-483-1177
DTOs and DSOs
F. T. Bums, Jr., JSC
713-483-1262
FCE and GFE
NSTS 37404
STS-74
SPACE SHUTTLE
MISSION REPORT
LMESIFlight Engineering and Vehicle Management Office
Approved by
Kenneth L. Brown
STS-74 Lead Mission Evaluation Room Manager
David W. Camp
Manager, Flight En_ement Office
///'J_Y k__reene . . _-
nager, Orbiter Project "_
Prepared by
Lockheed Martin Engineering and Sciences
for
Flight Engineering and Vehicle Management Office
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058
February 1996

STS-74 Table of Contents
Titl____e
INTRODUCTION .......................................... 1
MISSION SUMMARY ....................................... 3
SPACE STATION IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
AND LESSONS LEARNED ....................... 9
REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM .................... 9
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM ........................... 10
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING ................... 11
ATMOSPHERIC REVITALIZATION PRESSURE CONTROL
SYSTEM ...................................... 11
THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM ......................... 11
ORBITER DOCKING SYSTEM .......................... 12
PAYLOADS .............................................. 13
DOCKED ACTIVITIES ................................. 13
Docking Module ................................ 13
Science ResuD_lv .............................. 14
GLO EXPERIMENTIPHOTOGRAMMETRIC APPENDAGE
STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS EXPERIMENT
PAYLOAD ................................ 14
IMAX CARGO BAY CAMERA ........................... 16
SHUTTLE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT-II .............. 16
RISK MITIGATION EXPERIMENTS ....................... 16
ORBITER DOCKING SYSTEM ............................... 18
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE .................................. 20
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS ........................... 20
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTORS ................... 20
EXTERNAL TAN K .................................... 21
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES ....................... 22
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM ..................... 22
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS PERFORMANCE ................ 23
Main Propulsion System ......................... 23
Reaction Control Subsystem ..................... 24
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem ................... 24
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem.. 24
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem ................... 26
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem ................... 27
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem ........... 27
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem.. 28
Environmental Control and Life Support System ...... 28
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystem .... 30
Airiock Support System .......................... 31
V
STS-74 Table of Contents
Titl_._._e Pa_P_a.g_
Avionics and Software Support Subsystems .......... 31
Displays and Controls ............................ 32
Communications and Tracking Subsystems ......... 32
Operational Instrumentation/Modular
Auxiliary Data System ........................ 33
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems ............. 34
Integrated Aerodynamics, Heating and Thermal
Interfaces ................................... 34
Thermal Control System .......................... 35
Aerothermodynamics ............................. 35
Thermal Protection Subsystem and Windows ......... 35
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED
EQUIPMENT ................................ 37
REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM ............................. 38
CARGO INTEGRATION ....................................... 39
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVE/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY
OBJECTIVE ................................. 40
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES ...................... 40
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES ................ 42
PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS ................... 43
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS ...... 43
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS .... 43
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS ..... 43
List of Tables
TABLE I - STS-74 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ..................... 44
TABLE II - STS-74 ORBITER PROBLEM TRACKING LIST .......... 47
TABLE III - STS-74 GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
PROBLEM TRACKING LIST .............. 49
A - DOCUMENT SOURCES .................................. A-1
B - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................ B-1
vi
INTRODUCTION
The STS-74 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report summarizes the Payload
activities as well as the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster (SRB),
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine
(SSME) systems performance during the seventy-third flight of the Space Shuttle
Program, the forty-eighth flight since the return-to-flight, and the fifteenth flight of
the Orbiter Atlantis (OV-104). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle
consisted of an ET that was designated ET-74; three Phase II SSMEs that were
designated as serial numbers 2012, 2026, and 2032 in positions 1, 2, and 3,
respectively; and two SRBs that were designated BI-076. The RSRMs,
designated RSRM-51, were installed in each SRB and the individual RSRMs
were designated as 360T051A for the left SRB, and 360T051B for the right SRB.
The STS-74 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle
Program requirement as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VII, Appendix E.
The requirement stated in that document is that each organizational element
supporting the Program will report the results of their hardware (and software)
evaluation and mission performance plus identify all related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objectives of this flight were to rendezvous and dock with the Mir
Space Station and perform life sciences investigations. The Russian Docking
Module (DM) was berthed onto the Orbiter Docking System (ODS) using the
Remote Manipulator System (RMS), and the Orbiter docked to the Mir with the
DM. When separating from the Mir, the Orbiter undocked, leaving the DM
attached to the Mir. The two solar arrays, mounted on the DM, were delivered
for future Russian installation to the Mir. The secondary objectives of the flight
were to perform the operations necessary to fulfill the requirements of the GLO
experiment (GLO-4)/Photogrammetric Appendage Structural Dynamics
Experiment Payload (PASDE) (GPP), the IMAX Cargo Bay Camera (ICBC), and
the Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II).
The STS-74 mission was planned as an 8-day flight plus 2 contingency days,
which were available for weather avoidance or Orbiter contingency operations.
The sequence of events for the STS-74 mission is shown in Table I, and the
Orbiter Project Office Problem Tracking List is shown in Table I1o The
Government Furnished Equipment/Flight Crew Equipment (GFE/FCE) Problem
Tracking List is shown in Table II1. Appendix A lists the sources of data, both
formal and informal, that were used to prepare this report. Appendix B provides
the definition of acronyms and abbreviations used throughout the report. All
times during the flight are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) and mission
elapsed time (MET).
The five-person crew for STS-74 consisted of Kenneth D. Cameron, Col., U. S.
Marine Corps, Commander; James D. Halsell, Jr., Lt. Col., U. S. Air Force, Pilot;
Chris A. Hadfield, Major, Canadian Air Force, Mission Specialist 1; Jerry L.
Ross, Col., U. S.Air Force, Mission Specialist 2; and William S. McArthur, Jr.
Lt. Col., U. S. Army, Mission Specialist 3. STS-74was the fifth flight for Mission
Specialist 2; the third space flight for the Commander; the second space flight
for the Pilot and Mission Specialist 3, and the first space flight for Mission
Specialist 1.
MISSION SUMMARY
The planned launch of STS-74 on November 11, 1995, was scrubbed because
of unacceptable weather at the TransAtlantic Abort Landing (TAL) site. The
launch was rescheduled for November 12, 1995, and the countdown proceeded
nominally to a successful on-time launch at 316:12:30:43.013 G.m.t.
(7:30:43 a.m.e.s.t.). The orbital inclination was 51.6 degrees, and the ascent
was nominal.
An evaluation of vehicle performance during ascent was made using vehicle
acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the
average flight-derived engine specific impulse (Isp) that was determined for the
time period between SRB separation and start of 3g throttling was a nominal
452.29 seconds as compared to the main propulsion system (MPS) tag value of
452.70 seconds.
The auxiliary power unit (APU) 2 pump inlet pressure measurement became
erratic for approximately one minute during ascent and then recovered and
operated satisfactorily until APU 2 shutdown.
Two water spray boiler (WSB) problems occurred during ascent. WSB system 3
experienced a moderate under-cooling condition during which the temperature
reached 279 °F prior to the start of spraying. WSB system 2 experienced an
over-cooling condition during which the temperature decreased from 250 °F to
approximately 194 °F after the start of cooling. The water feed-line electric
heater modification was made on all three WSBs prior to this flight to mitigate
spray-bar freeze-up.
The hydraulic system 2 pressure decreased to 1500 psia after APU 2 shutdown,
and the pressure then rose to approximately 2550 psia and stabilized at
approximately 2460 psia. The system 2 pressure then dropped as system 3
pressure decreased approximately 5 seconds later. This event is similar to an
explained anomaly that occurred during STS-54 ascent in which back-driving of
a speed-brake power drive unit (PDU) motor occurred. Since the speedbrake
PDU motor brake was not failed, the back-driving event did not create any flight
impact.
No orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 1 maneuver was required as the
launch performance and trajectory were satisfactory. The OMS 2 maneuver was
performed at 316:13:12:35.0 G.m.t. (00:00:41:52.0 MET). The maneuver was
131.5 seconds in duration and the differential velocity (AV) was 213 ft/sec. The
resultant orbit was circularized at 162 nmi.
The payload bay doors were opened satisfactorily at 316:13:57:23 G.m.t.
(00:01:26:40 MET).
An OMS 3 maneuver was performed at 316:15:30:19.9 G.m.t.
(00:02:59:36.9 MET). The maneuver, using the right-hand orbital maneuvering
engine (OME), had a duration of 46.2 seconds and resulted in a AV of
37.6 ft/sec. The resulting orbit was 184 x 162 nmi.
The port radiator was deployed at 316:13:57 G.m.t. (00:01:26 MET) to reduce
flash evaporator system (FES) water consumption. The radiator was later
stowed prior to docking with the Mir.
The cabin was depressurized to 10.2 psia at 317:05:08 G.m.t. (00:16:37 MET).
This allowed extravehicular activity (EVA) crewmembers to prepare for a
contingency EVA in the event that the docking module was not successfully
mated to the Orbiter docking system (ODS).
When the thermal impulse printer system (TIPS) was activated, it was nominally
configured to receive data through the Ku-band system. When a test page was
sent via the Ku-band, the printed page had lines missing. After initial
troubleshooting failed to recover TIPS operation through the Ku-band system,
the TIPS was successfully used when configured to receive through the S-band;
however, in the S-band mode, the TIPS operates like a teleprinter and no longer
had the graphics capability. Further troubleshooting isolated the problem to the
front end processor (FEP) on the ground. A workaround was used that provided
full TIPS capability.
Checkout of the remote manipulator system (RMS) was successfully completed,
and a payload bay survey was performed using the RMS. Additionally, checkout
of the extravehicular mobility units (EMUs) was successfully completed in
preparation for a possible contingency extravehicular activity.
The OMS 4 maneuver occurred at 317:15:13:55.1 G.m.t. (01:02:43:12.1 MET).
The maneuver, using both OMEs in straight feed, had a duration of 40 seconds
and imparted a AV of 65.0 ft/sec. The OMS 5 maneuver occurred at
317:16:11:44.1 G.m.t. (01:03:41:01.1 MET). This 38-second firing used the left
OME and imparted a AV of 31.3 ft/sec. Both firings had nominal performance.
The docking module was grappled at approximately 318:06:00 G.m.t.
(01:17:29 MET) and unberthed from the Orbiter at approximately
318:06:40 G.m.t. (01:18:09 MET). It was then moved to the pre-install position,
12 inches above the ODS capture ring. The docking module was maneuvered to
within five inches of the ODS ring in preparation for the thrusting sequence
designed to force capture. Six reaction control subsystem (RCS) down-firing
thrusters were fired at 318:07:16:53 G.m.t. (01:18:46:09 MET), and capture was
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achieved. Ring retraction occurred nominally with dual-motor operation, and the
retraction was completed at 318:07:22 G.m.t. (01:18:51 MET). Hook actuation
also occurred nominally with dual-motor operation. The hooks were closed at
318:07:24 G.m.t. (01:18:53 MET), completing the mating operation.
Prior to opening the ODS hatch, the crew reported that the airlock stowage bag
on the ODS wall could not be removed due to two stuck actuating pins that
prevented the removal of the mounting-attachment fitting system (Flight Problem
STS-74-V-05). The bag was preventing the full opening of the hatch. Therefore,
the contents of the ODS stowage bag were removed and placed into a launch-
entry suit (LES) bag. Once the bag was emptied, the stowage bag drawstrings
were drawn, and this compressed the bag and allowed the hatch to be opened
without the removal of the bag. The stowage bag was utilized again at the end
of the mission for stowage.
The ODS vestibule was pressurized to 10.2 psia by the Orbiter at
318:08:07 G.m.t. (01:19:36 MET) and leak-checked successfully. The ODS
hatch was subsequently opened. The cabin repressurization to 14.7 psi was
initiated at 318:09:19 G.m.t. (01:20:48 MET). The docking module hatch was
opened at approximately 318:09:41 G.m.t. (01:21:10 MET).
The NC 4 rendezvous maneuver occurred at approximately 318:15:19 G.m.t.
(02:02:48 MET). The maneuver lasted 21 seconds and yielded a AV of
5.0 ft/sec. RCS thrusters L3A and R3A were used primarily, with a minimal
number of single pulses from the F3D, F3L, F4D, LIU, RIU and R3R thrusters.
At 318:20:02 G.m.t. (02:07:31 MET), all three fuel cell 3 substack differential
voltage measurements shifted approximately 8 mV, with no significant load
change on fuel cell 3 at the time. Additionally, the cell performance monitor
(CPM) self-test signal, which had been indicating 48 mV, shifted to a self-test
value of 56 inV. The value should be no more than 58 inV. Since the fuel cell
was performing nominally, the FDA alarm was subsequently inhibited to prevent
nuisance alarms. A precautionary main-B-to-main-C bus tie was established at
approximately 319:15:46 G.m.t. (03:03:15 MET). The CPM was replaced during
the postflight turnaround activities.
The port radiator was stowed and latched at 319:01:14 G.m.t. (02:12:43 MET) in
preparation for the Mir docking.
The NC 5 (OMS 6) rendezvous maneuver, performed using the right OME,
occurred at 319:01:53:04.5 G.m.t. (02:13:22:21.5 MET). The maneuver was
33 seconds in duration and imparted a AV of 28.0 f'dsec. The terminal phase
initiation (TI) maneuver, performed using the left OME, occurred at
319:03:26:43.3 G.m.to (02:14:56:00.3 MET). The TI maneuver lasted
9.4 seconds and imparted a AV of 8.6 ft/sec.
The Orbiter/Mir docking was initiated at 319:06:27 G.m.t. (02:17:56 MET). Ring
retraction was initiated at 319:06:30 G.m.t. (02:17:59 MET) and was nominal
with dual-motor operation. Hook actuation also occurred nominally with
dual-motor operation. The hooks were closed at 319:06:35 G.m.t.
(02:18:04 MET). Docking was completed with the ring reaching its final position
at 319:06:36 G.m.t. (02:18:05 MET). The hatches were opened at
319:09:02 G.m.t. (02:20:31 MET). All docking mechanical and avionics systems
performed nominally. Following hatch opening, the process of repressurizing
the Orbiter/Mir mated unit to 14.62 psi was initiated.
After the Orbiter/Mir docking, the crew reported that a bad data cable existed
between one of the hand-held light distance and ranging (LIDAR) units and one
of the payload general support computers (PGSCs). This is an RS-232 LIDAR
interface cable. There are two of these cables onboard, one for each hand-held
LIDAR.
At 319:18:32:09 G.m.t. (03:06:01:26 MET), the power reactant storage and
distribution (PRSD) subsystem oxygen manifold 1 isolation valve failed to close
when commanded. The hydrogen manifold 1 isolation valve closed successfully.
The hydrogen valve was subsequently reopened, and the hydrogen and oxygen
manifold 2 isolation valves were closed. This same serial number valve failed to
close on OV-105 during STS-49, STS-54, and STS-57. This valve successfully
passed cryogenic screening with the valve attached to the valve panel at the
NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD) in October 1993. The valve cycled
successfully during STS-66 and STS-71, as well as the first time it was
commanded closed on this flight.
At approximately 319:19:22 G.m.t. (03:06:51 MET), during a data dump of
operations (OPS) recorder 1, the ground was unable to lock-on the modulation
on track 8 of the recorder. The tape was then played in both the forward and
reverse directions, and data retrieval was unsuccessful. Additional
data-recovery procedures were performed, and again the ground was unable to
lock-on to the modulation on track 8. As a workaround, track 8 was not used for
recording data for the remainder of the flight.
The RCS was used to support the mated Orbiter/Mir structural dynamics test at
320:05:26 G.m.t. (03:16:55 MET). Thrusters F4D, L3D, R3D, LILwere all
pulsed once and F3D was pulsed twice. The thruster pulse data were nominal.
The ten contingency water containers (CWC) were filled with water and
transferred to the Mir. The total water transfer to the Mir was approximately
993 pounds.
The repressurization of the Mir and Orbiter crew cabin to a total pressure of
15.40 psia and an oxygen partial pressure (PPO2) of 3.85 psia was initiated at
321:06:54 G.m.t. (04:18:23 MET). At ODS hatch closure, the Orbiter cabin
pressure was 15.34 psi with a PP02 level of 25.52 percent. Closure of the hatch
was performed at 321:17:46 G.m.t. (05:05:15 MET). Vestibule depressurization
was completed at 321:18:29:44 G.m.t. (05:05:59:01 MET) and required
two minutes.
At 321:09:31 G.m.t. (04:21:00 MET), the flight crew reported that both the aft
port and aft starboard payload bay floodlights were not illuminated. Current
signatures on the mid main bus C were indicative of a payload bay floodlight
remote power controller (RPC) current limiting and tripping. The aft port payload
bay floodlight is powered by the mid main bus C.
Orbiter undocking from the Mir was completed at 322:08:15 G.m.t.
(05:19:44 MET). All docking mechanical and avionics systems performed
nominally. Primary RCS thrusters were used in the Iow-Z mode during the initial
separation from the Mir. The primary RCS was also used for the separation
maneuver. Performance was nominal. The Ku-band radar acquired and tracked
nominally during the Mir separation and flyaround.
During several Public Affairs events using a camcorder, the image went black
indicating a loss of power. The crew was notified, and the battery was replaced;
however, the same problem occurred between five and seven minutes later.
Initial indications were that the camcorder was being left in the "record pause"
mode, which would result in the camcorder being powered off after seven
minutes. Discussions with the crew revealed that this was not the case. The
camcorder in use was not identified (two onboard).
An OMS 8 maneuver was performed, using the left engine, at
322:15:14:19.7 G.m.t. (06:02:43:36.7 MET). The firing lasted 47 seconds,
yielding a AV of 41.7 ft/sec. An OMS 9 maneuver was initiated, using the right
engine, at 322:15:58:03.5 G.m.t. (06:03:27:20.5 MET). The firing duration was
55.4 seconds and the AV was 49.2 ft/sec. Both firings were satisfactory.
APU 3 was started at 323:09:06:03.486 G.m.t. (06:20:35:20.473 MET) for the
flight control system (FCS) checkout. Data review indicated that the FCS, APU
and hydraulic subsystems performed nominally. APU 3 was run longer than
normal (11 minutes 57.755 seconds) for verification of lubrication oil cooling
from WSB 3. The maximum lubrication oil return temperature reached with
controller A was 266 °F. This is within the specification for start of spray cooling,
which is no greater than 275 °F. A slight over-cooling condition to 249 °F
occurred before the steady-state temperature of 259 °F was reached. Spray
cooling was observed for about 2.5 minutes before switching to the WSB 3
controller B as planned. Nominal steady-state cooling was observed on the
WSB 3 controller B.
The Plume Impingement and Contamination (PIC) test [Development Test
Objective (DTO) 829] was conducted at 323:11:34 G.m.t. (06:23:03 MET).
Primary RCS thruster F3U was fired in two sets of ten 0.80 msec firings, and
thruster F4D was fired twice, once after each F3U test. In addition, primary RCS
thruster firings for the GLO experiment were performed between
323:18:41 G.m.t. (07:06:11 MET) and 323:19:14 G.m.t. (07:06:32 MET). Primary
RCS thrusters L1L, L1U, L3D, R3R, R1U, R3D, F3L, and F4L were fired.
The RCS hot-tire was performed at 324:09:43 G.m.t. (07:21:12 MET). Each
RCS thruster was fired twice. Analysis indicates that all thrusters performed
nominally.
All entry stowage and deorbit preparations were completed in preparation for
entry on the nominal end-of-mission landing day. The Ku-band antenna was
stowed at 323:20:50:21 G.m.t. (07:08:19:38 MET). The RMS was stowed for
entry, and the final power-down was completed at 323:21:16 G.m.t.
(07:08:45 MET). The payload bay doors were successfully dosed and latched
at 324:13:20:56 G.m.t. (08:00:50:13 MET). The deorbit maneuver was
performed at 324:15:58:43.2 G.m.t. (08:03:28:00.2 MET) on orbit 128 for
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF), and the maneuver
was 233.7 seconds in duration with a AV of 434 ft/sec. Entry interface
(400,000 ft) occurred at 324:16:30:03 G.m.t. (08:03:58:19 MET).
Entry was completed satisfactorily, and main landing gear touchdown occurred
on SLF concrete runway 33 at 324:17:01:29 G.m.t. (08:04:30:46 MET) on
November 20, 1995. The Orbiter drag chute was deployed at
324:17:01:32.4 G.m.t. and the nose gear touchdown occurred 5.6 seconds later.
The drag chute was jettisoned at 324:17:02:06.7 G.m.t. with wheels-stop
occurring at 324:17:02:25 G.m.t. The rollout was normal in all respects. The
flight duration was 8 days 4 hours 30 minutes and 46 seconds. The APUs were
shut down 18 minutes after landing.
SPACE STATION IMPLICATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS
LEARNED
REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Analysis of the RCS data revealed the following lessons learned in addition to
those discussed in the STS-71 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report with
respect to Mir and International Space Station docked operations.
1. RCS vernier thruster usage during STS-74 docking was significantly
higher than seen during the STS-71 docking mission, based on the evaluation of
the Advanced Thruster Life Analysis System (ATLAS). Although the totals are
lower, on the average and based on the total docked time with the Mir, usage
was actually higher than STS-71. This was the case in all four areas shown in
the following table.
THRUSTER USAGE DATA COMPARISON
Flight
STS-74
STS-74
STS-74
Thruster No.
F5L
F5R
L5D
STS-74 L5L
STS-74 R5D
STS-74 R5R
STS-74
Totals
STS-71
Totals
Thruster
Fidngs
2,580
2,458
3,640
2,073
3,354
2,267
16,372
19,907
Fidng Time,
seconds
4,192
5,224
6,341
3,833
6,659
4,283
30,436
32,327
Thermal
Cycles
100
Flight
Duration, hrs
148
N/A
131 N/A
152 N/A
86 N/A
N/A
116
733
840
N/A
197
223
For both missions, the number of firings was well within the 500,000-cycle
certification life. The firing time on the aft down-firing thrusters was very
marginal for the 125,000-second certified limit (~ 19-mission equivalent). A
large number of long-duration firings (> 50 seconds) were noted on the aft
down-firing thrusters for attitude maneuvering, some of which approached the
125-second duration limit for steady-state firings. Also, the high duty-cycles
noted during attitude-hold operations required evaluation to determine if the
1,000-cycle per hour limit was exceeded. The STS-71 and STS-74 vernier
usage continues to be evaluated to assess long-term effects on the hardware.
From a certified-life standpoint, concerns primarily exist with the chamber/nozzle
damage which would require chamber replacement. Coating damage is
primarily driven by the number of thermal cycles. While all vernier-usage
parameters vary depending on mission profile and duration, average vernier
mission thermal cycles based on the ATLAS evaluation of 63 previous missions
were:
1. F5L and F5R thrusters - 42 thermal cycles/mission
2. L5D and R5D thrusters - 105 thermal cycles/mission
3. L5L and R5R thrusters - 47 thermal cycles/mission
With thermal cycles on the order of 1.3 to 3 times higher than average, the
chamber wear-out rate would be expected to increase if future Mir and
International Space Station (ISS) docked missions resulted in similar usage.
This poses a significant spares risk to the Program, and this condition requires
detailed evaluation by both Engineering and Logistics. If usage can be
optimized (minimized) by better digital autopilot (DAP) models and/or primary
RCS thruster usage, the vernier usage may be significantly reduced from that
seen on STS-71 and STS-74 missions assuming future missions of similar
duration.
3. Thermal issues continue to be a concern for future ISS missions where
cold vernier thrusters and hot primary thrusters are expected. The NASA-JSC
Structures and Mechanics Division has been tasked to investigate the
temperature concerns.
FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM
Analysis of the flight control system operations and data lead to the following
lessons learned.
1. Vernier RCS control and stability was satisfactorily demonstrated for
Space Station payloads extended over the Space Shuttle nose.
2. Alternate primary RCS performance was demonstrated to provide
acceptable control while minimizing loads.
3. Improved control performance was demonstrated with the new
minimum-angle thruster selection for Space-Station sized payloads.
4. Updated thruster plume impingement models were satisfactorily
verified using the aft down-firing vernier RCS thrusters.
5. The patch to re-enable acceleration filter inhibit eliminated the
increased propellant consumption observed on STS-71.
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COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
Analysis of the communications and tracking data has lead to the following
conclusions concerning Space Station operations.
1. The Space Shuttle Orbiter communications coverage profiles in the
docked configuration and the planned attitudes were generated during the
preflight period. The coverage profiles and the attitudes were provided to the
Mission Operations Directorate personnel for planning purposes. Multipath
effects due to the Mir structure were included to provide realistic predictions.
Analysis predictions were also verified postflight with actual flight data to ensure
the validity and pedigree of the results. This same analysis method is being
used to determine the Orbiter coverage when docked with the International
Space Station and vise versa. Refinement of the analysis method and tool is on-
going with each Mir flight in preparations for the International Space Station
support. Coverage and multipath analyses are planned for ISS missions.
ATMOSPHERIC REVITALIZATION PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM
STS-74 data for this system has revealed the same information that was
reported in Lessons Learned shown in the STS-71 Mission Report.
THERMAL CONTROL SYSTEM
Analysis of the thermal control system (TCS) data from STS-74 has led to the
following concerns:
1. The thermal effects from the Mir on the Orbiter hydraulic lines in the
midfuselage and main landing gear tires were observed. The use of the Shuttle
Thermal Evaluation Program (STEP) (Orbiter alone) analysis data for nose-Sun
type attitudes will not reliably predict temperatures for the hydraulic lines and
main landing gear tires. As a result, the negative effects from the presence of
the International Space Station Alpha (ISSA) for nose-Sun type attitudes needs
to be assessed for ISSA missions using detailed thermal math models.
2. Violation of the vernier RCS leak detection limit of 130 °F is expected
even in low-beta ISSA missions. An operational workaround is required.
3. Data analysis during the flight showed that the APAS hardware
thermo-optical properties provided by the suppliers was either inaccurate or
insufficient or both. Prior to STS-76, a more complete survey of the flight unit is
planned.
t]
ORBITER DOCKING SYSTEM
Analysis of the docking system performance for both the docking and berthing
procedures lead to the following implications and lessons learned for the ISS.
1. The berthing procedure used to install the DM onto the ODS worked
very well and the analytical predictions had good correlation with flight data.
This success provides confidence for the ISS assembly flight 2A where this
same technique will be used to berth the U. S. Node onto the ODS, and then
berth the Russian FGB onto the Orbiter/Node stack.
2. The docking system worked well and the analytical predictions
correlated very well with flight data which provides confidence in the system and
procedures for ISS.
3. For the second time, the crew and Orbiter demonstrated the ability to
fly to the Mir very precisely, and this resulted in fairly benign contact conditions
that were well within the docking system's ability to tolerate. The provides
confidence for docking-related activities for the ISS.
4. Having flexibility to modify (non-real-time) the Post Contact Thrusting
(PCT) sequence proved to be very useful. This feature allows tuning of the
sequence to match the spacecraft mass properties and configuration to achieve
good capture performance and minimize loads and post-capture dynamics. This
will be very useful during the assembly of ISS as its mass properties and
configuration change.
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PAYLOADS
The mission objectives and joint requirements of the Phase 1 Program for the
second mission of joint operations with the Russian Mir Station were completed
satisfactorily. Approximately 275 resupply items were transferred from the
Orbiter to the Mir, and 195 return items were transferred from the Mir to the
Orbiter. The approximate weight of the transferred items to the Mir was
2132 lb. Included in the total that was transferred to the Mir was U. S and
Russian consumables, science resupply items, and supplemental atmospheric
gasses. The approximate weight of the return items transferred to the Orbiter
was 816 Ibm, and it consisted of U. S., Russian, and European Space Agency
(ESA) items. A Risk Mitigation Experiment (RME) that was not performed was
left on the Mir, and the experiment may be performed by the STS-76 crew in late
March of 1996. In addition, the jointly developed DM, weighing 9,066 Ibm, was
successfully transferred from the Shuttle and mated to the Mir. The DM now
provides a standard docking port on the Mir for the Shuttle and will facilitate
future Shuttle docking missions as the Mir configuration is enhanced.
DOCKED ACTIVITIES
Dockin.q Module
After the payload bay doors were opened, the DM systems were activated
through the Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical (ROEU) interface. The DM
system data were transmitted to both the Mission Control Center-Houston
(MCC-H) and MCC-Moscow (MCC-M) and evaluated by Russian and American
specialists. All systems were operating as planned. On flight day 3, the DM was
grappled by the RMS, deactivated, detached from the ROEU and lifted from the
payload bay. The DM was maneuvered to a position above the ODS, and the
crew prepared to join the DM to the ODS with the primary RCS thrusting
procedure. Per the nominal timeline, the structural latches on the Androgynous
Peripheral Assembly System (APAS) 2 and 3 achieved capture the first time the
Orbiter fired the down-firing thrusters. Hard mating of the DM to the ODS was
nominal. The DM was activated through the X-connector interface. After ODS
and DM pressure checks were completed, the U. S. crew entered the DM to
perform the tasks planned by both teams during preflight preparations. Russian
specialists were prepared in MCC-M to assist the crew. The crew installed the
air duct, removed the center-line camera, and disabled the negative pressure
relief valve. The power switching box in the ODS was configured to operate the
DM APAS 1. All DM systems operated nominally. On flight day 4, the crew
maneuvered the Orbiter and the DM to dock with the Mir Space Station.
Docking was successfully achieved between APAS 1 and the Krystal
mechanism. After the U. S. crew removed the centerline camera and bracket
and stowed the window fan, the U. S. and MIR crews opened the DM and Mir
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hatches to begin the joint mission activities. That same day, the joint DM power
transfer procedures were performed and control of the DM was formally
transferred to the Mir. The Orbiter configured the ODS switch box to control the
APAS 3. Undocking between the Orbiter and the Mir occurred on flight day 7 at
322:08:13:24 G.m.t. (05:19:42:41 MET). The DM remains as the permanent
Orbiter docking port on the Mir Space Station.
Science Resupply
Transfer and stowage of all Mir 211NASA 2 U. S. science resupply items on the
Mir and the transfer and stowage of all ambient science return items on the
Orbiter were accomplished as planned in accordance with the pre-mission
agreements. In addition, several changes to the transfer list were successfully
implemented by the crew following approval by the Space Shuttle Program. The
final transfer tracking log was updated and sent to KSC to assist in the
destowage of the vehicle. The final science transfer tally is as follows:
a. Science Resupply to Mir - 100 items;
b. U. S. Science Return - 80 items;
c. Russian Return - 67 items; and
d. European Space Agency - 48 items.
Onboard Mir, the thermal electric freezer (TEF) lids were replaced and verified
to be functioning nominally. Following transfer of frozen samples to the Orbiter,
the Mir Thermal Electric Holding Freezer (TEHOF) was defrosted. Video of the
Mir treadmill and ergometer was also accomplished by the Orbiter crew. The
video will be used by principal investigators to identify potential locations for
future U. S science hardware. A space ergometer mounting pin and a set of
ergometer shoes were also transferred to the Mir for use during Mir 21 science
activities. A water sample was taken from the Mir potable water tank for analysis
by ground personnel. In addition, samples from the Mir EDV water containers,
consisting of Mir humidity separator condensate, were obtained to assess the
recent ethylene glycol leak which occurred on the Mir.
GLO EXPERIMENT/PHOTOGRAMMETRIC APPENDAGE STRUCTURAL
DYNAMICS EXPERIMENT PAYLOAD
The Photogrammetric Appendage Structural Dynamics Experiment (PASDE)
successfully completed all primary mission objectives, including recording the
dynamic response of the Mir Kvant 2 Module solar array through Orbiter/Mir
docking, and during primary RCS thruster-firing activities and terminator
crossings. PASDE supplemented these activities with several secondary
science data collections including a predocking RMS maneuver, an additional
primary RCS thruster firing sequence, Orbiter maneuvers, and solar array
tracking slews. Recorded video data were analyzed postflight to determine the
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structural dynamics of the Mir solar panels. The PASDE's photogrammetric
method, if proven to work efficiently through the STS-74 data analysis, will be
used for structural verification of the International Space Station solar panels.
The PASDE instruments were powered up and operation of all cameras and tape
recorders was verified within 1.5 hours after the payload bay doors were
opened. On flight day 2, a calibration using the RMS in a predetermined
position verified the camera angles prior to the first data collection period. On
flight day 4, the highest priority mission objective, which was recording the
deflections of the Kvant module solar array during the Orbiter-Mir docking, was
accomplished. PASDE also recorded the motions of the Kvant module solar
array during scheduled primary RCS thruster firings. The primary RCS test was
repeated because of a checklist error that placed the RMS in a position that
blocked two PASDE camera fields-of-view during the first test. On flight day 6,
the PASDE successfully completed the primary objectives of that payload, and
also gained some additional science data for the secondary objectives. PASDE
recorded two terminator events to investigate how the structural stability of array
structures are affected by the thermal effects experienced during orbital sunrises
and sunsets. Minor blotches were noted in the video images, and these were
determined to be internal to the PASDE cameras and did not impact the mission
objectives. The PASDE instrument performed flawlessly throughout the mission
and was powered down prior to undocking and configured for entry. The PASDE
recorded 114 of a possible 115 minutes of data collection.
The GLO-4 experiment was also verified following power-up and checkout
shortly after payload bay door opening. The GLO-4 was modified for this
mission to include a cold cathode pressure gauge, and this enhancement
measured pressure variations in the cargo bay. These data will aid in the
understanding of the interaction between the spacecraft environment and the
atmospheric environment during thruster firings and while docked to the Mir.
The GLO also successfully recorded Earth limb, airglow, stellar occultation's,
extensive night-glow, and OMS and primary RCS thruster firings. A change in
altitude from 215 to 185 nmi provided GLO with plume fluorescence data at a
different altitude to aid in the understanding of the orbital environment optical
effects.
On flight day 8, the GLO low-light TV camera iris failed closed and attempts to
recover the use of the camera were unsuccessful. This loss of video did not
seriously affect the quality of data collection as other Orbiter cameras were used
as a back-up to provide video data. During sleep periods while docked with the
Mir, the GLO instrument was placed in standby to avoid overheating. Data were
obtained on two additional tests of a primary GLO experiment, the primary RCS
fluorescence experiment, and resulted in a 100-percent successful mission for
this experiment.
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IMAX CARGO BAY CAMERA
All of the IMAX cargo bay camera (ICBC) film was exposed with no anomalies
recorded. The main objective of this mission was to record DM unberthing, DM
installation, and Shuttle/Mir docking and undocking, and all of these activities
were successfully accomplished.
SHUTTLE AMATEUR RADIO EXPERIMENT-II
All planned Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II (SAREX-II) contacts on
STS-74, including one test pass, five school contacts (Crown Point, IN., Lake
Heights, IL., Pocatello, ID., Norwalk, CT., and San Jose, CA.), and five personal
contacts were completed. During these contacts, 3175 people were in
attendance with rebroadcasts to local communities. Five television stations and
ten newspapers covered the contacts.
Many amateur radio operators also reported making contact with the Orbiter; the
SAREX-II team estimates as many as 100 contacts per flight day (over 500 for
the flight). The crew operated from the Mir radio while docked, and the very high
frequency (VHF) radio using the payload bay antenna onboard the Orbiter while
undocked.
RISK MITIGATION EXPERIMENTS
Five Risk Mitigation Experiments (RMEs) were performed on the STS-74
mission. The following paragraphs discuss each RME.
RME 1301- Mated Shuttle and Mir Structural Dynamics Test - RME 1301 was
performed shortly after docking to confirm the capability of the alternate digital
autopilot (ALT DAP) to control the mated Orbiter/Mir configuration. Additional
primary RCS thruster firings were performed in support of the PASDE. The
Russians confirmed their acceptance of using ALT DAP should the vernier RCS
fail.
RME 1305 - Assessment of Mir Space Station Sound Environment - RME 1305
was set up shortly after docking to collect data on the noise environment at
several locations inside the Mir. These data were analyzed postflight for
potential impact to hardware development for the International Space Station.
RME 1306 - Mir Wireless Network Experiment - RME 1306 was not performed.
Extensive technical discussions with the Russians did not result in an agreement
for operation during the available docked time. The Mir Wireless Network
Experiment (WNE) was left onboard the Mir and may be operated during the
next joint docking mission (STS-76).
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RME 1308 - Photogrammetric Appendage Structural Dynamics Experiment - The
PASDE was part of the GPP payload and is discussed in that paragraph of this
report.
RME 1310 - Shuttle/Mir Alignment Stability Experiment - RME 1310 provided
state-vector data from both the Orbiter and Mir while in the docked configuration.
These data were analyzed postflight to determine the stability of the stacked
configuration.
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ORBITER DOCKING SYSTEM
The Orbiter Docking System (ODS) performance was nominal, and no in-flight
anomalies were identified. The ODS carried a new Androgynous Peripheral
Docking System (APDS) that had been modified compared to the STS-71 APDS
with the addition of four interface connectors. The ODS also carried a Russian-
built connector switching mechanism (CSM) mounted on the truss assembly. It
was used to transfer avionics functions from the ODS APDS to the DM APDS
once the DM was attached to the ODS.
During the first phase of the mating operations that occurred on flight day 3, the
APDS demonstrated the ability to berth at the docking interface. The RMS
unberthed and maneuvered the DM to position the docking interface at a
separation of approximately five inches from the extended capture ring of the
ODS APDS. The RMS was then placed in the test mode (free drift) so it would
not resist the docking mechanism alignment during the berthing process. Once
the alignment was verified, the crew initiated a thrusting sequence to gently push
the Orbiter toward the DM and force the docking interfaces together to achieve
capture. Once capture was achieved, the APDS completed the mating process
by attenuating the relative motion, retracting the capture ring and then closing
the structural hooks to complete the normal docking procedure. Data obtained
during the berthing phase of the mission compared well with the preflight
analysis that was performed for verification of the procedure. The success of
this phase of the mission and the very good analytical correlation's provide
confidence for the ISSA assembly 2A where the same technique will be used.
The docking phase of the mission that occurred on flight day 4 was nominal.
The main difference between this docking procedure and the STS-71 procedure
was that the docking interface was mounted on top of the DM, approximately
15 feet outside the payload bay, and this made viewing the docking interface
more difficult. To compensate for this condition, the RMS was positioned such
that its camera provided a good view of the docking interface as the docking
occurred. The APDS was powered and commanded from the Orbiter using the
Russian-built aft flight panel, and the nine avionics boxes which are mounted in
the bottom of the airlock. After the DM was installed onto the ODS, the Russian-
built CSM was used to switch power command and control from the ODS APDS
to the APDS on top of the DM. Once the switching was completed, the avionics
functions traveled through four ODS APDS interface connectors and along
cables on the DM to reach the DM APDS.
The actual docking occurred on November 15, with the ODS being powered up
at 319:05:53:47 G.m.t. (02:17:23:04 MET). The docking contact conditions were
well within the allowable limits. The closing velocity was very near the targeted
0.1 ft/sec, and the misalignments were small. Post-contact thrusting (PCT) was
]8
initiated with approximately two inches of separation. The PCT used for this
mission was modified from STS-71 to compensate for the large mass properties
change. Capture occurred at 319:06:27:40 G.m.t. (02:17:56:57 MET). Docking
loads were reconstructed from flight data and showed a maximum axial load of
850 kg, compared to an allowable of 1900 kg.
The ODS avionics activated the automatic docking sequence after receiving the
initial capture signal. The electromagnetic dampers were activated at 5 seconds
after capture and remained on for 30 seconds. The ring-extend command
occurred at 60 seconds after capture. The crew depressed the =Power On"
switch to interrupt the automatic sequence, as planned, to allow further damping.
After the ring alignment signal was received, the crew initiated the ring-in
command to drive the ring to the final position. The structural hooks were
activated with the ready-to-hook signal and closed within about 2.5 minutes.
Docking was completed at 319:06:36:14 G.m.t. (02:18:05:31 MET), and the
normal system pressurization followed.
At the end of the docked phase of the mission, the structural hooks were opened
after the vestibule was depressurized. Once open, four spring-loaded plungers
separated the two spacecraft at a low velocity. Unlike STS-71, the Orbiter's
predicted separation rate correlated very well with the measured values.
Undocking was completed at 322:08:15:44 G.m.t. (05:17:45:01 MET).
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VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
The overall performance of all elements of the vehicle was satisfactory with only
five Orbiter in-flight anomalies defined. The following paragraphs provide a
more detailed discussion of individual subsystem performance as well as the
in-flight anomalies.
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS
All Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) systems performed as expected. The SRB
prelaunch countdown was normal, and no SRB Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or
Operational Maintenance and Requirements and Specification Document
(OMRSD) violations occurred. No in-flight anomalies were noted from the data
review.
Both SRBs were successfully separated from the External Tank (ET) at
T+123.004 seconds, and reports from the recovery team indicate that the
deceleration subsystems performed as designed. Both SRBs were returned to
Kennedy Space Center for disassembly and refurbishment.
REUSABLE SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
All Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) systems performed satisfactorily.
Power-up and operation of all igniter and field joint heaters was accomplished
routinely. All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits
throughout the countdown. For this flight, the low-pressure heated ground purge
in the SRB aft skirt was used to maintain the case/nozzle joint temperatures
within the required LCC ranges. At T-15 minutes, the purge was changed to
high pressure to inert the SRB aft skirt.
Data indicate that the flight performance of both RSRMs was well within the
allowable performance envelopes. The performance was typical of that
observed on previous flights, and within the contract end item (CEI) specification
limits. The RSRM propellant mean bulk temperature (PMBT) was 75 °F at liftoff.
The maximum trace shape variation of pressure vs. Time was calculated to be a
very nominal 1.4 percent at liftoff plus 72 seconds (left motor), and 1.1 percent at
liftoff plus 69.5 seconds (right motor). The trace shape variation for both motors
was well within the 3.2 percent allowable limit.
Field joint heaters operated for a total of 25 hours, which includes operation
during the scrubbed launch attempt. Power was applied to the igniter heating
elements an average of 36 percent of the time during the LCC time frame.
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The igniter joint heaters operated for 23 hours 27 minutes total including the
scrubbed launch attempt. Power was applied to the igniter joint heating
elements an average of 52 percent during the LCC time frame.
The aft skirt purge operated for 24 hours 30 minutes and the nozzle/case joint
temperatures in the aft skirt were maintained within the minimum LCC limits.
The calculated flex bearing mean bulk temperature was 83 °F. The following
table shows the significant propulsion parameters from the flight.
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter
Impulse gates
1-20, 106 Ibf-sec
1-60, 10 e Ibf-sec
I-AT, 10 s Ibf-sec
Vacuum Isp, Ibf-sec/Ibm
Burn rate, irdsec @ 60 °F
at 625 psia
Burn rate, irdsec @ 81 °F
at 625 psia
Event times, seconds"
Ignition interval
Web time ='
50 psia cue time
Action time b
Separation command
PMBT, °F
Maximum ignition rise rate,
psia/10 ms
Decay time, seconds
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Tailoff Imbalance Impulse
differential, Klbf-sec
Left motor,
Predicted I
66.33
176.53
297.20
268.6
0.3694
0.3734
0.232
108.7
118.4
120.5
123.5
75
90.4
2.8
74 °F
Actual
66.27
176.63
296.52
Right motor, 74 °F
Predicted I Actual
66.22
176.30
297.23
66.23
176.52
296.05
Predicted
N/A
268.0 268.6 268.4
0.3705 0.3690 0.3700
0.3745 0.3730 0.3740
0.232
108.9
118.6
120.7
123.5
N/A
108.2
118.2
120.4
123.0
N/A
108.5
118.1
120.5
123.0
75 75 75
N/A 90.4 N/A
3.0 2.8 3.4
Actual
344.7
Impulse Imbalance = Integral of the absolute value of the left motor thrust minus
right motor thrust from web time to action time. b
• All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by a
b Referenced to liftoff time (ignition interval).
EXTERNAL TANK
All objectives and requirements associated with ET propellant loading and flight
operations were met satisfactorily, and the performance of the subsystems was
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excellent. All ET electrical equipment and instrumentation operated
satisfactorily. The ET purge and heater operations were monitored and all
performed properly. No ET LCC or OMRSD violations were identified.
Typical ice/frost formations were observed on the ET during the countdown.
No ice or frost were observed on the acreage areas of the ET. Normal
quantities of ice or frost were present on the liquid oxygen (LO=) and liquid
hydrogen (LH=) feed-lines and on the pressurization line brackets, and some
frost or ice was present along the LH= protuberance air load (PAL) ramps.
These observations were acceptable based on NSTS 08303. The ice/frost Red
Team reported that no anomalous thermal protection system (TPS) conditions
existed. The umbilical mounted camera film showed successful performance of
the redesigned jack-pad closeouts.
The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and
flight. The minimum LO= ullage pressure experienced during the ullage pressure
slump was 13.4 psid.
ET separation occurred as planned with the postflight predicted ET entry impact
point 19 nmi. Up-range of the preflight prediction.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
All Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) parameters appeared to be normal
throughout the prelaunch countdown and were typical of prelaunch parameters
observed on previous flights. Engine ready was achieved at the proper time; all
LCC were met; and engine start and thrust buildup were normal.
Flight data indicate that SSME performance during main-stage, throttling,
shutdown, and propellant dumping operations was normal. High pressure
oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP)
temperatures were well within specification throughout engine operation. The
specific impulse (Isp) was rated as 452.29 seconds based on trajectory data.
Space Shuttle main engine cutoff (MECO) occurred at T+512.6 seconds after
engine start. No in-flight anomalies or significant problems were noted during
the countdown or flight.
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices
were armed and system inhibits were turned off at the appropriate times. All
SRSS measurements indicated that the system operated as expected throughout
the countdown and flight. No in-flight anomalies were noted from the data
analysis.
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As planned, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and the SRB system power was
turned off prior to SRB separation. The ET system remained active until ET
separation from the Orbiter.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMS PERFORMANCE
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was nominal with
no in-flight anomalies identified. The LH2 loading was performed as planned
with no stop-flows or reverts. The LO2 loading experienced a revert because of
the failure of the primary facility liquid oxygen pump. The failure was caused by
an over-voltage condition and lasted for 18 minutes until the backup pump was
brought on-line. No OMRSD or LCC violations were noted during the
countdown.
Throughout the period of preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas
concentrations were detected. The maximum hydrogen concentration level in
the Orbiter aft compartment was approximately 120 ppm, and it occurred shortly
after the start of the fast-fill process. This concentration level compares
favorably with previous data from this vehicle.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus
the inventory (planned) loads resulted in a loading accuracy of 0.004 percent for
LHz and 0.004 percent for LO=. These values are well within the required
accuracy of + 0.37 percent for the LH2 and 0.43 percent for the LO=.
Ascent MPS performance was completely nominal with no in-flight anomalies
identified. Data indicate that the LO2 and LH= pressurization systems performed
as planned, and that all net positive suction pressure (NPSP) requirements were
met throughout the flight. The gaseous hydrogen flow control valve performance
was nominal. The manifold repressurization for entry was satisfactory with
helium usage totaling 59.3 Ibm.
The gaseous oxygen (GO2) fixed orifice pressurization system performed as
predicted. Reconstructed data from the SSME and MPS parameters closely
matched the actual ET ullage pressure measurements. The minimum LO2 ullage
pressure experienced during the period of ullage pressure slump was
13.43 psid.
STS-74 was the first flight of the gaseous helium pressurization system
modifications. The manifold was reoriented and new flow control valves were
installed during the STS-74 flow. All three flow control valves performed
nominally. These valves are being removed during the STS-76 flow as part of
the second phase of the gaseous helium pressurization system modification
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during which new lines and filters will be installed. Helium system performance
and pneumatic helium systems operated nominally.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) performed nominally throughout all
phases of the STS-74 mission with no anomalies identified. A total of 4,840 Ibm
of propellants were used from the RCS tanks during the mission. In addition,
RCS interconnect to the orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) provided
3,013.3 Ibm (23.26 percent) of OMS propellants for RCS use.
Docking with the Mir was supperted with satisfactory RCS thruster performance.
While docked with the Mir, the RCS vernier thrusters provided the primary
means of attitude control. Planned operations while docked also were supported
with satisfactory performance. These operations included the Structural
Dynamics test, the Risk Mitigating Experiment (RME) 1301 performance, and the
Shuttle/Mir Structural Dynamics test. Also, the RCS was used to perform the
undocking and fly-around maneuvers.
Orbital Maneuvedn,q Subsystem
The orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) was used for a total of nine
maneuvers during the STS-74 mission, and no in-flight anomalies were
identified. The left OMS engine was fired for 499.6 seconds and the right OMS
engine was fired for 539.8 seconds. A total of 23,209.4 Ibm of OMS propellant
were consumed during the mission; and of this total, the RCS used 3,013.3 Ibm
(23.2 percent) during interconnect operations. The table on the following page
lists all of the OMS maneuvers and the pertinent data concerning each
maneuver.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performed nominally
throughout the mission with one in-flight anomaly recorded. The consumables
remaining at landing would have provided a mission extension capability of 116 hours
at an average power level of 15.9 kW. A total of 2296 Ibm of oxygen and 271 Ibm of
hydrogen was consumed during the mission. Oxygen supplied for environmental
control (82 Ibm) and to resupply the Mir (59 Ibm) totaled 141 Ibm.
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OMS FIRINGS
OMS firing Engine Ignition time, G.m.t./MET
Firing
duration,
seconds
131.4
AV, ft/sec
OMS-2 Both 316:13:12:35.0 G.m.t.
00:00:41:52.0 MET
OMS-3 Right 316:15:30:19.9 G.m.t. 46.2 37.6
00:02:59:36.9 MET
OMS-4 Both 40.0 65.0
OMS-5 Left
OMS--6 Right
Left
Left
Right
Both
OMS-7
316:15:18:55.1 G.m.t.
01:02:48:12.1 MET
316:16:11:44.1 G.m.t.
01:03:41:01.1 MET
319:01:53:04.5 G.m.t.
02:13:22:21.5 MET
319:03:26:43.3 G.m.t.
02:14:56:00.0 MET
322:15:14:19.7 G.m.t.
06:02:43:36.7 MET
322:15:58:03.5 G.m.t.
06:03:27:20.5 MET
324:15:58:43.2 G.m.t.
08:03:28:00.2 MET
OMS-8
OMS-9
38.0
33.0
9.4
47.0
55.4
233.7Deorbit
213.0
31.3
28.0
8.6
41.7
49.2
434.0
At 319:18:32:09 G.m.t. (03:06:01:26 MET), the PRSD subsystem oxygen
manifold 1 isolation valve failed to close when commanded (Flight Problem
STS-74-V--02). After the first failed attempt, the switch was held in the CLOSE
position for 10 seconds with no valve response. The hydrogen manifold 1
isolation valve closed satisfactorily. The hydrogen valve was subsequently
reopened, and the hydrogen and oxygen manifold 2 isolation valves were
closed. This same serial number valve failed to close on 0V-105 during
STS-49, STS-54, and STS-57. This valve successfully passed cryogenic
screening with the valve attached to the valve panel at the NSLD in October
1993. The valve cycled successfully during STS-66 and STS-71, as well as the
first time it was commanded closed on this flight. The valve also closed
satisfactorily on the ground during postlanding operations.
The hydrogen manifold 1 isolation valve, SIN CRP0020, gave a false-close
indication at 324:12:39:46 G.m.t. (08:00:09:03 MET), setting off an FDA alarm.
The crew reported that the valve went closed on its own and that no one
touched the switch. The valve was commanded open without any change in the
position indicator. The malfunction procedure was followed, and the switch was
first commanded closed and then open. The position indicator immediately
changed to open at 324:12:44:38 G.m.t. (08:00:13:55 MET). The two hydrogen
manifold pressure curves did not diverge on the downward slope of the pressure
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cycle during the five-minute period that the indication was closed, confirming that
this was a false-closed indication. The same anomaly occurred on STS-71, the
last flight of this vehicle, when six false-closed indications occurred.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The fuel cell powerplant (FCP) subsystem performed nominally. The fuel cells
generated 3120 kWh of electrical energy at an average power level of 15.9 kW
and 521 amperes. The fuel cells consumed 271 Ibm of hydrogen and 2155 Ibm
of oxygen and produced 2426 Ibm of water. The actual fuel cell voltages at the
end of the mission were 0.10 volt above predicted for fuel cells I and 2, and
0.15 volt above the predicted for fuel cell 3. The overall performance
degradation for the entire mission was 0.10 volt for fuel cell 1 and 0.15 volt for
fuel cells 2 and 3. Fuel cell 1 (S/N 117) was removed and replaced since the
performance of this fuel cell is close to the end-of-life curve as it had
2298 operational hours when shut down at the end of the mission. One in-flight
anomaly was noted, and it did not impact the mission.
At 318:20:02 G.m.t. (02:07:31 MET), all three fuel cell 3 substack differential
voltage measurements shifted approximately 8 mV, and there was not a
significant load change on fuel cell 3 at the time (substack I shifted down and
substacks 2 and 3 shifted upward). Additionally, the cell performance monitor
(CPM) self-test signal, which had been indicating 48 mV, shifted to a self-test
value of 56 mV (Flight Problem STS-74-V-02). The value should be no more
than 58 mV. Since the fuel cell was performing nominally, the FDA alarm was
subsequently inhibited to prevent nuisance alarms. A precautionary main-B-to-
main-C bus tie was established at approximately 319:15:46 G.m.t.
(03:03:15 MET). The CPM will be replaced during the postflight turnaround
activities.
The fuel cell 2 hydrogen flow-meter was biased low. This flow-meter was
installed on this fuel cell in September of 1989, and it flew the first five flights of
OV-105 with no bias. The fuel cell was sent to the vendor after STS-61 because
of a diagnostic test anomaly. During the acceptance test procedure (ATP) at the
vendor, the output of the flow-meter was detected to be biased low and
exceeded the error limits. A waiver was written on this component and the fuel
cell was placed in the spares inventory. The fuel cell was installed in the
OV-104 vehicle following the STS-66 mission and was flown with the low bias on
STS-71. This condition did not impact operations as the instrument provides a
gross leak detection capability as well as confirmation of purge operations.
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Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The auxiliary power unit (APU) subsystem performed nominally. The following
table shows the APU's by serial number, position, run time, fuel consumption
and flight phase.
APU RUN TIMES AND FUEL CONSUMPTION
APU 1 (SIN 208) APU 2 (SIN 406) APU 3 (SIN 310)
Flight phase
Time,
min:sec
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
Time,
min:sec
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
Time,
min:sec
Fuel
consumption,
Ib
Ascent 25:58 57 26:03 57 26:10 59
FCS 11:59 26
checkout
Entry = 61:57 114 85:36 142 62:06 115
Total 87:55 171 111:39 199 100:15 200
"The APUs ran for approximately 18 minutes after landing.
One in-flight anomaly was noted during ascent when the APU 2 fuel pump inlet
pressure operated erratically and repeatedly failed to 0 psia for a 1-minute
15-second period after which the measurement operated properly for the rest of
the mission (Flight Problem STS-74-V-01).
All of the requirements of Development Test Objective (DTO) 414 - APU
Shutdown Test have been fulfilled, and the DTO was not performed on this flight
nor will it be on any future flight of any vehicle.
Hydraulics/Water Spray Boiler Subsystem
The hydraulics/water spray boiler (WSB) subsystem performance throughout the
mission was nominal. No in-flight anomalies were identified; however, two WSB
problems occurred during ascent, and are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
WSB system 3 experienced a moderate under-cooling condition during which
the temperature reached 279 °F prior to the start of spraying. This under-
cooling condition was similar to those seen on other flights. The water feed-line
electric heater modification was made on all three WSBs prior to this flight to
mitigate spray-bar freeze-up. Also, STS-74 was the second flight in which an
electric heater was powered and an under-cooling condition was observed.
WSB system 2 experienced an over-cooling condition during which the
temperature decreased from 250 °F to approximately 195 °F after the start of
2"7
cooling. Control was switched from controller 2A to 2B; however, data show that
spraying had already stopped when the switchover was made. Water usage was
nominal throughout ascent.
APU 3 was started at 323:09:06:03.486 G.m.t. (06:20:35:20 MET) for the flight
control system (FCS) checkout. Data review indicated that the FCS, APU and
hydraulic subsystems performed nominally. APU 3 was run longer than normal
(total of 11 minutes 57.755 seconds) for verification of lubrication oil cooling from
WSB 3. The maximum lubrication oil return temperature reached with controller
A was 266 °F. This is within the specification for start of spray cooling, which is
no greater than 275 °F. A slight over-cooling condition to 249 °F occurred
before the steady-state temperature of 259 °F was reached. Spray cooling was
observed for about 2.5 minutes before switching to the WSB 3 controller B as
planned. Nominal steady-state cooling was observed on the WSB 3 controller
B.
The hydraulic system 2 pressure decreased to 1535 psia after APU 2 shutdown
following ascent, and the pressure then rose to above 2400 psia after which it
stabilized at approximately 2460 psia. The system 2 pressure then dropped as
system 3 pressure decreased approximately 5 seconds later. This event is
similar to an explained anomaly that occurred during STS-54 ascent in which
back-driving of a speed-brake PDU motor occurred. Since the speed-brake PDU
motor brake was not suspected to be failed, the back-driving event did not create
any flight issues.
Postlanding, the WSB 3 regulator outlet pressure transducer operated erratically
(Flight Problem STS-74-V-06). Intermittent pressure fluctuations were noted
from 0 psia to 39.9 psia and back to 0 psia. The pressure transducer was
checked during turnaround operations, and the erratic operation was duplicated.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
The electrical power distribution and control (EPDC) subsystem performed
satisfactorily throughout the mission. No in-flight anomalies or problems were
noted.
Environmental Control and Life Support System
The environmental control and life support system (ECLSS) performed
satisfactorily throughout the mission.
The active thermal control system (ATCS) performance was satisfactory
throughout the mission. Flash evaporator system B was used prior to docking
with the Mir to support Mir water transfer from supply water tanks A and B.
There were no actively cooled payloads in the payload bay, and, as a result,
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both Freon loops remained in the interchanger position for the entire mission.
The port radiator was deployed at 316:13:57 G.m.t. (00:01:26 MET) to reduce
flash evaporator system (FES) water consumption. The radiators were stowed
prior to docking.
The radiator coldsoak provided cooling during entry through touchdown plus
11 minutes when ammonia system A was activated using the secondary
controller at 324:17:11 G.m.t. (08:04:41 MET). Ammonia system A operated for
29 minutes when it was turned off in preparation for ground-cooling connection.
The atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) air and water coolant loops
performed normally.
At 318:00:43:39 G.m.t. (01:12:12:56 MET), the pump for WCL 1 was
commanded on by the GPC for a water loop cycle. The WCL 1 pump runs
6 minutes every 4 hours. The crew was asleep at the time of this cycle and the
cabin heat-load was low. As a result, WCL 2 was flowing at only 660 Ib/hr to
maintain the WCL 2 pump outlet temperature at 63 °F. When the WCL 1 pump
was turned on, the WCL 1 water was warmer than that in WCL 2, and as a
result, temperature transients were induced throughout WCL 2. The WCL 2
pump outlet temperature initially increased to 64.7 °F during this transient, and
the controller increased the WCL 2 interchanger flow-rate to 760 Ib/hr to bring
the temperature back down. With this increase in flow and other transients in
the loop, the WCL 2 pump outlet temperature decreased to 60.4 °F and caused
the controller to decrease the interchanger flow to approximately 490 Ib/hr,
which was below the 550 Ib/hr FDA alarm limit. The resulting alarm woke the
crew. The WCL system performed nominally, and this phenomenon was not
considered a problem other then being a nuisance alarm.
The carbon dioxide partial pressure was maintained below 7.96 mmHg. The
cabin air temperature and relative humidity peaked at 83.0 °F and 51.2 percent,
respectively. Avionics bays 1, 2, and 3 air outlet temperatures as well as water
coldplate temperatures were maintained within satisfactory limits throughout the
mission.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system (ARPCS) performed
normally throughout the flight. The cabin was depressurized to 10.2 psia at
317:05:08 G.m.t. (00:16:37 MET) using the airlock depressurization valve. This
allowed EVA crewmembers to prepare for a contingency EVA in the event that
the DM had not successfully mated to the ODS. However, the DM/ODS mating
was satisfactory and no EVA was required.
After the DM was installed on the ODS, the ODS vestibule was pressurized to
10.2 psia by the Orbiter at 318:08:07 G.m.t. (01:19:36 MET) and leak-checked
successfully. The pressure was then equalized between the Orbiter and DM at
29
14.68 psia at 318:09:19 G.m.t. (01:20:48 MET). After docking with the Mir, the
DM/Mir hatch equalization valves were opened and the Mir and Shuttle volumes
were equalized at a total pressure of 13.20 psia. The docking module hatch was
opened at approximately 318:09:41 G.m.t. (01:21:10 MET). After the Mir
transfer hatches were opened, the entire Shuttle/Mir volume pressure was raised
to 14.62 psia using the Shuttle ARPCS. Total oxygen and nitrogen consumables
transferred to the Mir was 44.16 Ib of nitrogen and 58.97 Ib of oxygen. The
nitrogen was used for Mir pressurization, and the oxygen was used for the
additional crew metabolic consumption during the docked phase and for raising
the total pressure and PPOz of the ShutUe/Mir. The repressurization of the Mir
and Orbiter crew cabin to a total pressure of 15.40 psia and an PPO= of
3.85 psia was initiated at 321:06:54 G.m.t. (04:18:23 MET). At ODS hatch
closure [321:17:46 G.m.t. (05:05:15 MET)], the Orbiter cabin pressure was
15.34 psi with a PP02 level of 25.52 percent. Vestibule depressurization was
completed at 321:18:29:44 G.m.t. (05:05:59:01 MET) and required two minutes.
The supply water system performed normally throughout the mission. Supply water
was managed through the use of the FES, the overboard dump system, and water
transfer to the Mir. One supply water dump was performed at a rate of
1.73 percent/minute (2.858 Ib/min). The higher-than-normal dump rate resulted
from the simultaneous FES operations. A single burp was seen following the
dump, and this was caused by the purge assembly not being used at that time.
The supply water dump line temperature was maintained between 67 and 99 °F
throughout the mission with the operation of the line heater. The string A heaters
experienced a dithering thermostat, as expected from the previous flight data.
Ten contingency water containers (CWCs) were used for Mir water transfer.
Each CWC fill required approximately 25 minutes to complete with a total of
993 Ib of water transferred in the 10 CWCs to the Mir. Five CWCs had only
silver biocide added, while the other five had silver biocide and minerals.
Waste water accumulated at the predicted rate. Four waste water dumps were
performed at an average rate of 1.91 percent/minute (3.16 Ib/min). The waste-
water dump-line temperature was maintained between 55 and 75 °F throughout
the mission. The vacuum vent line temperature was maintained between 58 and
76 °F, with the vacuum vent nozzle maintained between 88 and 185 °F.
The waste collection system performed normally throughout the mission.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystems
The smoke detection system showed no indications of smoke during the flight.
Use of the fire suppression system was not required.
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Airlock Support System
The airlock support system performed normally with no problems identified. The
active system monitor parameters indicated normal outputs throughout the flight.
The airlock depressurization valve was used to depressurize the cabin from
14.7 psia to 10.2 psia should a contingency EVA have been required in support
of the DM being docked with the ODS. After the DM was docked to the ODS,
the external airlock-to-vestibule hatch equalization valve was used to equalize
the DM and Space Shuttle habitable volume pressures.
Avionics and Software Support Subsystems
The integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystem performed nominally
during all phases of the mission.
An "1/O ERR CRT 1" fault message was annunicated by the guidance, navigation
and control (GNC) general purpose computers at 322:08:03 G.m.t.
(05:19:32 MET). The crew reported no anomalous indications on the cathode
ray tube (CRT) 1 other than the fault message. A explanation of this condition is
described in User Note D027, "DEU Poll Response Checksum Anomalies."
At 322:18:39 G.m.t. (06:06:09 MET), while the crew was attempting to take a
checkpoint to mass memory unit (MMU) 2, two fault messages, "$60 CHECKPT
FAIL" and "OFF/BUSY MMU2", were annunciated. As indicated by the
messages, the checkpoint was unsuccessful. A second attempt to perform the
checkpoint was initiated and was successful. Discrepancy Report (DR) 107971,
which documents a software timing issue for checkpoint operations, explains this
fault message.
The flight control system performance was nominal. All on-orbit flight control
mission objectives were accomplished. A new minimum-angle thruster-selection
algorithm was used for the first time and performance was nominal. The software
patch to re-enable acceleration filter inhibit eliminated the increased propellant
consumption that was observed on STS-71. The mated aft down-firing vernier
thruster acceleration matched updated thruster plume predictions.
The Mir control performance were nominal based on data analysis.
The mated primary RCS structural dynamics test (RME 1301) was completed
nominally three times. The results validated the preflight model predictions within
the given uncertainties. As a result, the alternate primary RCS digital autopilot
(ALT DAP) was available for control of the combined stack, had a vernier RCS
thruster failed.
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The closed-loop alternate primary RCS control test was completed and nominal
performance was demonstrated. Attitude hold, maneuver capability and control of
a large space-station sized payload were satisfactorily demonstrated.
Star tracker performance was nominal as was the performance of the inertial
measurement units. The data processing system (DPS) hardware and software
performed satisfactorily.
Displays and Controls Subsystem
The displays and control subsystem performed nominally. No in-flight anomalies
were noted; however, two items of interest were noted.
The hydrogen manifold 1 isolation valve, SIN 20, gave a false-close indication at
324:12:39:46 G.m.t. (08:00:09:03 MET). Approximately 5 minutes later, the
valve indicated open after the close command, and the open command was
given at that time. The same anomaly occurred on STS-71, the last flight of this
vehicle, when six false-close indications occurred.
At 321:09:31 G.m.t. (04:21:00 MET), the flight crew reported that both the aft
port and aft starboard payload bay floodlights were not illuminated. Current
signatures on the mid main bus C were indicative of a payload bay floodlight
RPC current limiting and tripping. The aft port payload bay floodlight is powered
by the mid main bus C.
Communications and Trackinq Subsystems
The performance of the communications and tracking subsystem was nominal.
One in-flight anomaly and a number of minor problems were noted, and these are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
During prelaunch preparations, a transmit/receive relay for the Merritt Island
Launch Area (MILA) TELTRAC ultrahigh frequency (UHF) air-to-ground voice
system failed. An alternate UHF system was used for ascent with nominal
performance. The TELTRAC system was repaired, and operation during landing
was nominal.
During the communications activation prior to launch, the frequency modulation
(FM) system 1 did not modulate the carrier with the expected frequency
deviation (0.75 Hz vs. 1.6 Hz to 2.5 Hz). The decision was made to launch using
FM system 2. The operations recorder was dumped on-orbit to evaluate the
performance of the FM system 1. All dumps were nominal.
A smudge was noted in the middle of the closed circuit television camera C
(SIN 212) downlink video. Attempts to bum off the smudge by closing the iris
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and pointing the camera toward the Sun were ineffective. Video from this
camera remained degraded but was usable.
At 323:01:07 G.m.t. (06:12:37 MET), during downlink of a multiplexed (split-
screen) combination of views from payload bay cameras A and D, the right half
of the multiplexed video was noted to have incorrect chroma, although video
from all cameras downlinked separately was nominal. To troubleshoot the
condition, various combinations of the payload bay cameras (A, B, C and D) and
video switching unit multiplexers (1 and 2) were viewed. Depending on the
combination selected, the incorrect chroma was present either on the right side,
on both sides, or on neither side. No obvious pattern was noted. This
phenomenon occurred previously on this vehicle during STS-71, and is
attributed to the video cameras having cables of different lengths to the video
switching unit. This introduces color phasing differences in the split-screen
configuration. Single camera downlink video was not affected.
When the TIPS was activated, it was nominally configured to receive data
through the Ku-band system. When a test page was sent via the Ku-band, the
printed page had lines missing. After initial troubleshooting failed to recover
TIPS operation through the Ku-band system, the TIPS was successfully used
when configured to receive through the S-band; however, in the S-band mode,
the TIPS operates like a teleprinter and no longer has the graphics capability.
Further troubleshooting isolated the problem to the FEP on the ground. A
workaround was used that provided full TIPS capability.
Trajectory control sensor (TCS) 1 and 2 operated nominally for rendezvous.
However, TCS 1 did not perform the short and long calibrations at the proper times.
This condition did not impact the rendezvous operations. TCS 1 operated
satisfactorily throughout the undocking and separation phase.
TCS 2 failed the self-test two consecutive times during the power-up for thermal
conditioning on the day before the undocking. In both cases, the power was
cycled, and the third self-test was satisfactory. TCS 2 failed self-test again just
prior to Mir separation, and the unit was not available until separation had been
completed. Consequently, a test to determine whether the TCS could lock on the
wrong reflectors on the Mir was not performed.
Operational Instrumentation/Modular Auxiliary Data System,
The operational instrumentation (OI) subsystem performed nominally with one
exception. At approximately 319:19:22 G.m.t. (03:06:51 MET), during a data
dump of operations (OPS) recorder 1, the ground was unable to lock on to the
modulation on track 8 of the recorder. The tape was then played in both the
forward and reverse directions, and data retrieval was unsuccessful. Additional
data-recovery procedures were performed, and again the ground was unable to
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lock on to the modulation on track 8. As a workaround, track 8 was not used for
recording data for the remainder of the flight. This condition did not cause the
loss of any significant amount of data from the mission.
The modular auxiliary data system (MADS) performed satisfactorily and all data
on the recorder was successfully dumped postflight.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
All mechanical systems performed satisfactorily with no in-flight anomalies
noted. Drag chute performance was also nominal. The tires and brakes were in
good condition for a landing on the SLF runway. Landing and braking data are
presented in the following table.
Landing and Braking Parameters
From
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sink rate, ft/sec Pitch rate,
ft keas deg/sec
Main gear touchdown 2564 201.3 ~ 2.2 N/A
Nose gear touchdown 5567 157.3 N/A --5.8
Brake initiation speed
Brake-on time
Rollout distance
Rollout time
Runway
Orbiter weight at landing
Brake sensor
location
Left-hand inboard 1
Left-hand inboard-3
Peak
pressure,
psia
768
696
708Left-hand outboard 2
Left-hand outboard 4 708
852Right-hand inboard 1
Right-hand inboard 3
Right-hand outboard 2
Right-hand outboard 4
864
840
780
73.2 knots
24.4 seconds
8,598 feet
57.8 seconds
33 (Concrete) KSC SLF
202,898 Ib
Brake assembly Energy,
million ft-lb
Left-hand outboard 6.75
Left-hand inboard 7.74
Right-hand inboard
Right-hand outboard
9.84
9.89
Integrated Aerodynamics1 Heatina, and Thermal Interfaces
Ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal.
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Aerodynamic and plume heating were nominal during ascent and entry. No
anomalous conditions have been identified.
Thermal interface temperatures were nominal.
Thermal Control System
Performance of the thermal control system was nominal during all phases of the
mission. All subsystem temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits.
It was determined during the mission that the APAS hardware thermal-optical
properties were either inaccurate or insufficient. Prior to STS-76, a more
complete survey of the flight unit will be completed.
Aerothermodynamics
The acreage heating was nominal based on structural temperature data. Also,
the structural temperature rise rate on the left and right wing was symmetrical
and within the experience base. Local heating was also nominal.
Thermal Protection Subsystem and Windows
The thermal protection subsystem (TPS) performed satisfactorily. Based on
structural temperature response data (temperature rise), the entry heating was
nominal. Boundary layer transition from laminar flow to turbulent flow was
symmetrical and occurred at 1151 seconds after entry interface on the aft
centerline and right-hand side of the vehicle, and about 10 seconds later on the
later on the aft left side of the vehicle. Thermocouple data are not available to
determine transition on the forward centerline of the vehicle.
The postlanding inspection of the TPS identified 116 damage sites (hits) of
which 21 had a major dimension of 1 inch or greater. This total does not reflect
the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to the flame arrestment
sparkler system. A comparison of these numbers to statistics from 57 previous
missions of similar configuration indicates that the number of hits 1-inch or larger
was average while the total number of hits was less than average. The
distribution of the hits on the Orbiter is shown in the table on the following page.
The largest lower-surface tile damage site occurred near the Orbiter centerline
immediately forward of the ETIOrbiter umbilicals. The damage site measured
3.5 inches long by 1.5 inches wide by 0.25 inch deep. Many tile damage sites
were located to the right of the centerline on the lower surface. Hits in this area
along a line from nose to tail are attributed to ice impacts from the ET liquid
oxygen feed-line bellows and support brackets.
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TPS DAMAGE SITES
Orbiter Surfaces
Lower Surface
Upper Surface
Right Side
Left Side
Hits > 1 Inch
17
0
Total Hits
78
31
0
0 0
Right OMS Pod 1 2
Left OMS Pod 2 5
Total 21 116
Tile damage sites aft of the LHz and LOz ET/Orbiter umbilicals was typical.
damage was most likely caused by impacts from umbilical ice or shredded
pieces of umbilical purge barrier material flapping in the airstream. No tile
damage sites was attributed to micrometeorites or on-orbit debris.
The
All three dome-mounted heat shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were in excellent
condition with no missing material. The DMHS blanket at the SSME 1 six o'clock
position was slightly torn and frayed. No body-flap hinge stub tiles were missing
or damaged. Tiles on the vertical stabilizer stinger and around the drag chute
door were intact and undamaged.
A total of seven tile damage sites, including three sites larger than 1-inch in size,
were observed on the leading edge tiles of the OMS pods. A flexible reusable
surface insulation (FRSI) blanket repair patch and the leading edge corner of a
FRSI blanket were peeled back at two locations on the upper side of the left
OMS pod.
Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited moderate hazing and streaking. A light haze
was present on all the other windows. Damage to the window perimeter tiles
was less than usual and concentrated between windows 3 and 4. The damage
sites were caused by impacts from forward RCS paper cover pieces and room
temperature vulcanizing (RTV) material.
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FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT/GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT
The flight crew equipment (FCE)/Government furnished equipment (GFE)
performed nominally. Two in-flight anomalies were noted, neither of which
impacted flight operations or meeting flight objectives.
Prior to opening the ODS hatch, the crew reported that the airlock stowage bag
on the ODS wall could not be removed due to two stuck actuating pins that
prevented the removal of the mounting-attachment fitting system (Flight Problem
STS-74-V--05). The bag was preventing the full opening of the hatch. Therefore,
the contents of the ODS stowage bag were removed and placed into a LES bag.
Once the bag was emptied, the stowage bag drawstrings were drawn, and this
compressed the bag and allowed the hatch to be opened without the removal of
the bag. The stowage bag was utilized again at the end of the mission for
stowage.
During several Public Affairs events using a camcorder, the image went black
indicating a loss of power. The crew was notified, and the battery was replaced;
however, the same problem occurred between five and seven minutes later
(Flight Problem STS-74-F-02). Initial indications were that the camcorder was
being left in the "record pause" mode, which would result in the camcorder being
powered off after seven minutes. Discussions with the crew revealed that this
was not the case. Based on these discussions, the problem appears to be either
insufficiently charged batteries or a camcorder that is drawing unusually high
amounts of power. The camcorder in use was not identified (two onboard).
After the Orbiter/Mir docking, the crew reported that a bad data cable existed
between one of the hand-held LIDAR and one of the PGSCs (Flight Problem
STS-74-F-01). This was an RS-232 LIDAR interface cable. There were two of
these cables onboard, one for each hand-held LIDAR.
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REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM
The primary remote manipulator system (RMS) activity during the flight was the
installation of the 5-meter long Docking Module onto the Orbiter Docking System
(ODS) to enable docking of the Orbiter with the Mir. The RMS was also
configured to provide camera views (elbow and wrist) of the final Orbiter/Mir
docking maneuver. In addition, the RMS supported several experiments.
The RMS was powered up and initialized approximately 4 hours into the flight.
Checkout of the RMS was successfully completed on flight day 2, and a payload
bay survey was performed using the RMS. The arm was then maneuvered to
the "poise for docking" position which provided the Orbiter Commander two
views of docking.
On flight day 3, the RMS performed its primary task of STS-74, when the DM
was grappled at approximately 318:06:00 G.m.t. (01:17:29 MET) and unberthed
from the Orbiter at approximately 318:06:40 G.m.t. (01:18:09 MET). The DM
was moved to the pre-install position, 12 inches above the ODS capture ring.
The docking module was then maneuvered to within 5 inches of the ODS ring in
preparation for the thrusting sequence designed to force capture. Docking was
successfully completed on flight day 4 at 322:08:13:24 G.m.t.
(02:17:56:57 MET).
On flight day 7 at 322:10:46:00 G.m.t. (05:22:15:17 MET) during a maneuver to
the precradle position, a "PDRS CNTL POR" error message was annunciated.
The was due to the trajectory deviating by more than 8 inches from commanded
trajectory when a full translation hand controller (THC) reversal was executed in
coarse rates. This message is expected when hardover hand-controller
commands of this type occur. This problem caused no impact to RMS
operations.
The RMS was powered down during the undocking activities. Following the
undocking, the RMS was powered up and during the process of uncradling the
arm, it was noted that the wrist roll joint was rotated 5.5 degrees prior to elbow
pitch uncradle. As would be expected, the other joints in the arm were slightly
back-driven and the POR at the end effector was moved up approximately
0.9 inch to accommodate the wrist roll position. The arm was successfully
uncradled with no signs of jamming. This condition should not have impacted
the RMS as the arm is designed to accommodate this movement. However, the
postflight inspection will focus on the areas where possible damage could occur.
The RMS was powered down on flight day 8 after very successful operations in
support of the mission, and with all RMS objectives met.
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CARGO INTEGRATION
Integration hardware performance was nominal throughout the mission with no
anomalies identified.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES/DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY
OBJECTIVES
Twelve Development Test Objectives (DTOs) and seven Detailed Supplementary
Objectives (DSOs) were assigned to the mission.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
DTO 301D - Ascent Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were recorded on the
MADS recorder, and the data were dumped postflight and given to the sponsor for
evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - Data were recorded on the MADS
recorder, and the data were dumped postflight and given to the sponsor for
evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance - No hand-held photographs of the ET were taken
on this mission as the +X maneuver was performed. The crew reported that the ET
was not seen.
Two rolls of umbilical well photography of the ET were acquired: the 35-mm film
from the LO= umbilical and one 16 mm film (5 mm lens) from the LH= umbilical. The
16 mm camera with the 10 mm lens did not run. The separation velocity of the ET
was 1.76 meters/second. A number of conditions were noted, but none were
anomalous.
DTO 624 - Radiator Performance - Some data were obtained for this DTO-of-
opportunity as the radiators were deployed throughout the mission. However, the
specific attitudes were not achieved for the desired duration because of attitude
requirements and constraints to the main objectives of the mission. The data were
given to the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of that evaluation will be issued
in separate documentation.
DTO 700-10 - Orbiter Space Vision System Video Taping - Orbiter Space Vision
System (OSVS) video of the Docking Module target as well as Mir configuration
data for postflight model development were recorded. These data will be used in
support of future software for this DTO. The data have been given to the sponsor
for evaluation, and the results will be reported in separate documentation.
DTO 700-11 - Orbiter Space Vision System Flight Unit Testing - Flight unit testing
of the DM during installation on the ODS used photogrammetric techniques for
tracking the DM. Success of this operation was determined posfflight through data
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collection and crew comments. During checkout, Advanced Space Vision Unit
(ASVU) system 1 experienced several video processor error messages. After an
unsuccessful reboot, the unit was reloaded with a fresh flight database, but further
troubleshooting and checkout were not performed. ASVU 2 was used as the
primary unit for DM installation.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This DTO-of-opportunity was not
performed as the minimum-required weather conditions were not present at the
time of landing.
DTO 829 - Plume Impingement and Contamination - The primary objective of this
DTO was to record data on a plate mounted on the RMS during the firing of the Mir
13-kg thrusters. Additional data were collected during primary RCS thruster firings
after a cold-soak to aid in expanding the data base. These data have been given
to the sponsor and an evaluation of the data will be reported in separate
documentation.
DTO 832 - Target of Opportunity Navigation Sensors - Data were acquired from the
star tracker during the approach and flyaround of the Mir. The data have been
given to the sponsor for evaluation to determine the success of using the Target of
Opportunity Navigation Sensors (TONS) as a rendezvous tool.
DTO 1118 - Photographic and Video survey of Mir Space Station - The electronic
still, video, and Hasselblad cameras recorded data on the exterior of the Mir.
These data showed the condition of the Mir and were used to detect
micrometeoroid or orbital debris impacts; to document the Orbiter approach,
docking, and separation; to assess relative motion of the Mir and the Orbiter; and
to analyze plume impingement effects. The Orbiter executed two Mir flyarounds for
documentation purposes after separation. The data have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation, and the report of the results will be in separate
documentation.
DTO 1120 - Mated Shuttle and Mir Free Drift Experiment - This DTO was not
performed because of the high beta angles and resulting thermal conditioning,
which did not allow Mir to operate in the free drift configuration for the required
duration.
DTO 1122 - APAS Thermal Data - The guide ring on the ODS was extended when
in a cold attitude for seven hours and when in a hot attitude for seven hours to
obtain APAS data for thermal model verification. These data have been given to
the sponsor for evaluation, and the results of the evaluation will be reported in
separate documentation. These data will be used to further correlate and refine
thermal mathematical models for use in future Mir and International Space Station
missions.
4]
DETAILED SU PPLEM ENTARY O BJ ECTIVES
Seven Detailed Supplementary Objectives (DSOs) were assigned to the STS-74
mission. Data were collected for each of these DSOs, and these data have been
given to the sponsor for evaluation. The results of the evaluation will be reported
in separate documentation. The seven DSOs were as follows:
a. DSO 485 - Inter Mars Tissue Equivalent Proportional Counter;
b. DSO 487 - Immunological Assessment of Crewmembers;
c. DSO 604 - Visual Vestibular Integration as a Function of Adaptation;
d. DSO 621 - In-Flight Use of Florinef to Improve Orthostatic Intolerance
Posfflight;
e. DSO 901 - Documentary Television;
f. DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography; and
g. DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography.
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PHOTOGRAPHY AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS
LAUNCH PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
On launch day, 24 of 24 expected videos of launch were received and reviewed. In
addition to the videos that were screened, thirty-three 16 mm films and nineteen
35 mm films of launch were screened. No anomalous conditions were noted in any
of the data reviewed.
ON-ORBIT PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
No screening or evaluating of on-orbit photography was requested during this
mission.
LANDING PHOTOGRAPHY AND VIDEO DATA ANALYSIS
On landing day, 13 videos were received and screened. No anomalous conditions
were noted.
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TABLE I.- STS-74 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event
APU Activation
SRB HPU Activation=
Main Propulsion System
Start"
SRB Ignition Command
(Linoff)
Throttle up to 104 Percent
Thrust=
Throttle down to
67 Percent Thrust=
Maximum Dynamic Pressure
Throttle up to 104 Percenta
Both SRM's Chamber
Pressure at 50 psia
End SRM =Action=
SRB Physical Separation a
SRB Separation Command
Throttle Down for
3g Acceleration=
3g Acceleration
Throttle Down to
67 Percent Thrusta
SSME Shutdowna
MECO
ET Separation
aMSFC supplied data
Description Actual time, G.m.t.
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
LH HPU System A start command
LH HPU System B start command
RH HPU System A start command
RH HPU System B start command
ME-3 Start command accepted
ME-2 Start command accepted
ME-1 Start command accepted
Calculated SRB ignition command
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-3 Command accepted
ME-2 Command accepted
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-3 Command accepted
ME-2 Command accepted
Dedved ascent dynamic pressure
ME-1 Command accepted
ME-3 Command accepted
ME-2 Command accepted
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
RH rate APU turbine speed - LOS
SRB separation command flag
ME-3 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
Total load factor
ME-3 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
ME-3 command accepted
ME-1 command accepted
ME-2 command accepted
MECO command flag
MECO confirm flag
ET separation command flag
316:12:25:56.063
316:12:25:56.749
316:12:25:57.431
316:12:30:15.083
316:12:30:15.243
316:12:30.15.403
316:12:30:15.563
316:12:30:36.458
316:12:30:36.577
316:12:30:36.679
316:12:30:43.013
316:12:30:46.920
316:12:30:46.939
316:12:30:46.946
316:12:31:08.680
316:12:31:08.698
316:12:31:08.706
316:12:31:34
316:12:31:42:281
316:12:31:42.297
316:12:31:42.307
316:12:32:40.773
316:12:32:41.133
316:12:32:43.623
316:12:32:43.753
316:12:32:46.013
316:12:32:46.013
316:12:32:47
316:12:38:12.685
316:12:38:12.688
316:12:38:12.716
316:12:38:14.6
316:12:39:09.323
316:12:39:09.329
316:12:39:09.357
316:12:39:15.683
316:12:39:15.689
316:12:39:15.718
316:12:39:16
316:12:39:17
316:12:39:35
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Event
APUDeactivation
OMS-1 Ignition
OMS-1 Cutoff
OMS-2 Ignition
OMS-2 Cutoff
Payload Bay Doors (PLBDs)
Open
OMS-3 Ignition
OMS-3 Cutoff
OMS-4 Ignition
OMS-4 Cutoff
OMS-5 Ignition
OMS-5 Cutoff
Port Radiator Stow
TABLE I.- STS-74 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
(Continued)
Description
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU 2 GG chamber pressure
APU 3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Port radiator stow 1
Port radiator stow 2
Port Radiator Latch Port radiator latch no. 1-6 Release 1
Port radiator latch no. 1-6 latch 1
OMS-6 Ignition
OMS-6 Cutoff
OMS-7 Ignition
OMS-7 Cutoff
Docking - Initial Contact
Docking - Complete
Initiation of Undocking
Undocking - Complete
OMS-8 Ignition
OMS-8 Cutoff
OMS-9 Ignition
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-pmp valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Initial contact
Docking dng final position
Actuation of hooks no. 1 ddve
Undock completell
Left engine bi-propvalve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine hi-prop valve position
Actual time, G.m.t.
316:12:51:53.994
316:12:51:59.848
316:12:52:07.173
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
316:13:12:35.1
316:13:12:35.1
316:13:14:46.5
316:13:14:46.5
316:13:56:04
316:13:57:23
N/A
316:15:30:19.9
N/A
316:15:31:06.1
316:15:18:55.1
316:15:18:55.3
316:15:19:35.1
316:15:19:35.1
317:16:11:44.1
N/A
317:16:12:22.1
N/A
319:01:12:56
319:01:12:56
319:01:13:21
319:01:13:44
N/A
319:01:53:04.5
N/A
319:01:53:37.5
319:03:26:43.3
N/A
319:03:26:52.7
N/A
319:06:27:40
319:06:36:04
322:08:13:24
322:08:15:44
322:15:14:19.7
N/A
322:15:15:06.7
N/A
N/A
322:15:58:03.5
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Event
TABLE I.- STS-74 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
OMS-9 Cutoff
Flight Control System
Checkout
APU Start
APU Stop
Payload Bay Doors Close
APU Activation for Entry
Deorbit Bum Ignition
Deorbit Bum Cutoff
Entry Interface(400K feet)
Blackout end
Terminal Area Energy Mgmt.
Main Landing Gear
Contact
Main Landing Gear
Weight on Wheels
Drag Chute Deployment
Nose Landing Gear
Contact
Nose Landing Gear
Weight On Wheels
Drag Chute Jettison
Wheel Stop
APU Deactivation
(Concluded)
Description
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-pmp valve position
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Actual time, G.m.L
N/A
322:15:58:58.9
323:09:06:03.486
323:09:18.01.241
PLBD left close I 324:13:17:17
PLBD right close I 324:13:19:55
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 324:15:53:48.598
APU-1 GG chamber pressure 324:16:17:22.248
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 324:16:17:25.139
324:15:58:43.2
324:15:58:43.3
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Left engine bi-prop valve position
Right engine bi-prop valve position
Current orbital altitude above
Data locked (high sample rate)
Major mode change (305)
LH main landing gear tire pressure 1
RH main landing gear tire pressure2
LH main landing gear weight on
wheels
RH main landing gear weight on
wheels
Drag chute deploy I CP Volts
NLG U-I tire pressure 1
NLG weight on wheels I
Drag chute jettison I CP Volts
Velocity with respect to runway
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
324:16:02:36.9
324:16:02:37:0
324:16:30:02
No blackout
324:16: 55:14
324:17:01:28
324:17:01:28
324:17:01:29
324:17:01:32
324:17:01:32.4
324:17:01:37
324:17:01:38
324:17:02:06.7
324:17:02:25
324:17:19:19.074
324:17:19:25.209
324:17:19:30.622
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DOCUMENT SOURCES
In an attempt to define the official as well as the unofficial sources of data for
this mission report, the following list is provided.
1. Flight Requirements Document
2. Public Affairs Press Kit
3. Customer Support Room Daily Reports
4. MER Daily Reports
5. MER Mission Summary Report
6. MER Quick Look Report
7. MER Problem Tracking List
8. MER Event Times
9. Subsystem Manager Reports/Inputs
10. MOD Systems Anomaly List
11. MSFC Flash Report
12. MSFC Event Times
13. MSFC Interim Report
14. Crew Debriefing comments
15. Shuttle Operational Data Book
A-1

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations and their definitions as these items
are used in this document.
ALT DAP
APAS
APU
ARPCS
ARS
ASVU
ATCS
CPM
CRT
CWC
DAP
DEU
DM
DMHS
DPS
DR
DSO
DTO
t_V
ECLSS
EDV
EMU
EPDC
ESA
ET
EVA
FCE
FCP
FCS
FDA
FEP
FES
FM
FRSI
ft/sec
GFE
GLO
G.m.t.
GNC
GN2
GPC
GPP
alternate digital autopilot
Androgynous Peripheral Assembly System
auxiliary power unit
atmospheric revitalization pressure control system
atmospheric revitalization system
Advanced Space Vision Unit
active thermal control system
cell performance monitor
cathode ray tube
contingency water carrier
digital autopilot
display electronics unit
Docking Module
dome-mounted heat shield
data processing system
Discrepancy Report
Detailed Supplementary Objective
Developmental Test Objective
differential velocity
Environmental Control and Life Support System
Russian water bottle
extravehicular mobility unit
electrical power distribution and control subsystem
European Space Agency
External Tank
extravehicular activity
flight crew equipment
fuel cell powerplant
flight control system
fault detection and annunciation
front end processor
flash evaporator system
frequency modulation
flexible reusable surface insulation
feet per second
Government furnished equipment
Spacecraft Glow Experiment
Greenwich mean time
guidance, navigation and control
gaseous nitrogen
general purpose computer
GLO ExperimentJPhotogrammetric Appendage Structural Dynamics Experiment
Payload
B-1
HPFTP
HPOTP
Hz
ICBC
IMAX
Isp
KSC
kW
kWh
LCC
LES
LMES
LH2
LIDAR
LO2
MADS
MCC
MCC-M
MECO
MET
MILA
Mir
MMU
MPS
NASA
nmi.
NPSP
NSLD
NSTS
02
ODS
OI
OME
OMRSD
OMS
OPS
OSVS
PAL
PASDE
PDU
PGSC
PIC
PMBT
ppm
PPO2
PRSD
RCS
RME
RMS
highpressure fuel turbopump
high pressure oxidizer turbopump
Hertz
IMAX cargo bay camera
Canadian camera system
specific impulse
Kennedy Space Center
kilowatt
kilowatt hour
Launch Commit Cdteda
launch/entry suit
Lockheed Martin Engineering and Science
liquid hydrogen
light distance and ranging
liquid oxygen
modular auxiliary data system
Mission Control Center
Mission Control Center-Moscow
main engine cutoff
mission elapsed time
Merdtt Island Launch Area
Russian Space Station
mass memory storage unit
main propulsion system
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
nautical mile
net positive suction pressure
NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot
National Space Transportation System (i.e., Space Shuttle Program)
oxygen
Orbiter Docking System
operational instrumentation
orbital maneuvering engine
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
orbital maneuvering subsystem
operations
Orbiter Space Vision System
protuberance air load
Photogrammetric Appendage Structural Dynamics Experiment
power drive unit
payload general support computer
Plume Impingement and Contamination
propellant mean bulk temperature
parts per million
partial pressure oxygen
power reactant storage and distribution
reaction control subsystem
Risk Mitigation Experiment
Remote Manipulator System
B-2
ROEU
RPC
RSRM
RTV
S&A
SAREX-II
SLF
SIN
SRB
SRSS
SSME
TAL
TCS
TEF
TEHOF
THC
TI
TIPS
TONS
TPS
UHF
Vdc
VHF
WCL
WNE
WSB
Remotely Operated Electrical Umbilical
remote power controller
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor
room temperature vulcanizing
safe and arm
Shuttle Amateur Radio Experiment-II
Shuttle Landing Facility
serial number
Solid Rocket Booster
Shuttle range safety system
Space Shuttle main engine
transatlantic Abort
trajectory control system
Thermal Electric Freezer
Thermal Electric Holding Freezer
translation hand controller
terminal phase initiation
Thermal Impulse Printer System
Target Opportunity Navigation Sensors
thermal protection subsystem
ultrahigh frequency
Volts, direct current
very high frequency
water coolant loop
Wireless Network Experiment
water spray boiler
B-3

